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Cudgel or Carrot: How Roper v.
Simmons Will Affect Plea Bargaining
in the Juvenile System
By D. Brian Woo
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2005, the United States Supreme Court held, in Roper v. Simmons,
that the execution of convicted juveniles violated the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.' In addressing the issue, the
Court determined that a national consensus had developed against the
execution of juveniles.2 Ultimately, a majority of the court decided that a
national public consensus had been reached against the execution of
juveniles under 18 in age. 3
1. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) [hereinafter Roper]. Christopher Simmons
killed Shirley Crook when he was only 17 years old. Id. at 558. The state of Missouri charged him
with murder; at trial he was convicted and sentenced to death. Id. at 557. After numerous appeals,
the Missouri Supreme Court reversed the conviction. On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court
affirmed the Missouri Supreme Court's decision to set aside Christopher Simmons verdict.
2. In reversing Simmon's conviction, the Missouri Supreme Court found that:
[A] national consensus has developed against the execution of juvenile offenders, as
demonstrated by the fact that eighteen states now bar such executions for juveniles, that
twelve other states bar executions altogether, that no state has lowered its age of
execution below 18 since Stanford, that five states have legislatively or by case law
raised or established the minimum age at 18, an that the imposition of the juvenile death
penalty has become truly unusual over the last decade.
Id. at 559 (citing State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397, 399 (2003) (en banc). See Atkins
v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002). This "national consensus" test developed through a long line
of death penalty jurisprudence. "The Constitution contemplates that in the end our own judgment
will be brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of the death penalty under the Eighth
Amendment," Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977). Later, in Penry v. Lynaugh, the Court
held that national public opinion was against the execution of mentally retarded convicts. 492 U.S.
302 (1989).
3. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 568. The Court concluded that a national consensus had developed
because a majority of the states forbid the imposition of the death penalty on juvenile offenders
younger than eighteen. Id. In addition, the Court did not limit its assessment of national consensus
to the United States alone, but also reviewed whether other countries permitted the execution of
1
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The Roper decision rested on a long line of evolving jurisprudence; as
society's attitudes towards the execution of juveniles has changed, so too has
the law evolved to exempt certain classes of people.4 The law in this area
focuses on whether an amorphous national consensus has developed against
the death penalty. Prior to Roper, the Supreme Court concluded on several
occasions that a national consensus had not developed.5 However, over time
the line has gradually advanced from holding that 15 year old defendants
could not be executed, to barring the death penalty for the mentally retarded.
Finally, in 2005, this line of jurisprudence culminated in the Roper
decision.6
With Roper, no longer can juveniles of any age be executed.7 This
decision will undoubtedly affect the entire juvenile penal system, from how
cases enter the system, to how they exit the system. And in a system so
reliant on plea bargaining, Roper has now removed the ultimate retributive
factor-the possibility that a jury will sentence the juvenile to death-from
the prosecutor's deck of cards. No longer can the prosecutor seek the death
penalty in juvenile cases, in order to receive a plea bargain for a lesser
sentence.
This comment examines the effect Roper v. Simmons will have on plea
bargaining in the juvenile system. Part II discusses the Supreme Court's
juveniles. Id. at 575. After finding that "the United States is the only country in the world that
continues to give official sanction to the death penalty," the Court acknowledged the international
consensus against the juvenile death penalty to confirm its holding. Id. at 578.
4. This jurisprudence often reflects how the Supreme Court defines "national consensus."
While the majority in Roper draws from many sources-including polls, research, state attitudes,
and foreign attitudes-the dissent believes overwhelming evidence, such as state statutes, must be
considered to determine if a national consensus has developed. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 609 (Scalia,
J., dissenting) ("[o]ur previous cases have required overwhelming opposition to a challenged
practice, generally over a long period of time.").
5. In Stanford v. Kentucky, decided in 1989, the Court found that no national consensus
existed against the execution of 16 and 17 year old offenders. 492 U.S. 361, 378 (1989). The same
day Stanford was decided, the Court rejected a categorical exemption for mentally retarded persons
sentenced to death. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 334 (1989).
6. In Atkins v. Virginia, the Court reconsidered the Penry holding, stating that modem
standards of decency had evolved that now forbid the execution of the mentally retarded. See Atkins,
536 U.S. at 314-321. In much the same way that the Atkins court held a national consensus had
developed against the execution of the mentally retarded, Roper challenges the Stanford holding to
determine whether modem norms now consider the execution of juveniles as "cruel and unusual
punishment." See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
Because certain groups are less culpable, "the death penalty may not be imposed on certain classes
of offenders, such as juveniles under 16, the insane, and the mentally retarded, no matter how
heinous the crime." Roper, 543 U.S. at 568 (citing Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 856 and Ford
v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986)).
7. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578.
2
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decision in Roper.8 Part III presents the framework and goals of the juvenile
system. 9 Part IV analyzes the impact of the Roper decision on the juvenile
criminal justice system.' 0 Finally, Part V concludes the comment.
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S HOLDING N ROPER V. SIMMONS
Christopher Simmons was only 17 when he murdered Shirley Crook and
18 when he was convicted and sentenced to death." He bragged to friends
about his plan to murder a woman because as a juvenile he could "get away
with it.' 12 Simmons then broke into Shirley Crook's house, tied her up, and
threw her off a bridge. 13 The state of Missouri charged him with murder and
sought the death penalty.14 Following a jury trial, Simmons was convicted
and sentenced to death. 5
Following unsuccessful appeals and habeas petitions, Simmons filed a
petition for post-conviction relief, after the United States Supreme Court
decided Atkins v. Virginia in 2002.16 The Court held in Atkins that due to
"evolving standards of decency," the Eighth Amendment prohibits the
execution of a mentally retarded person. 17 The Atkins decision reversed the
holding in the case of Penry v. Lynaugh: that a mentally retarded defendant
could be executed (decided thirteen years prior). 18 The Supreme Court had
several reasons for reversing Penry, including the fact that sixteen states had
prohibited the execution of the mentally retarded over the thirteen years
8. See infra, notes 11-56 and accompanying text.
9. See infra, notes 57-88 and accompanying text.
10. See infra, notes 89-143 and accompanying text.
11. Roper, 543 U.S. at 556, 558.
12. Id. at 556.
13. Id. at 556-57.
14. Id. at 557.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (citing Ford v. Wainright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986)).
18. Roper, 543 U.S. at 565 (explaining that the Atkins decision was in large part due to new
state statutes prohibiting the execution of mentally retarded people). In making its holding, the
Court also found that "with respect to retribution-the interest in seeing that the offender gets his
"just deserts"--the severity of the appropriate punishment necessarily depends on the culpability of
the offender." Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319.
477
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since the Penry decision, and the view that because of their deficiencies,
mentally retarded offenders were less culpable than other criminals.' 9
Simmons' new petition alleged that under the logic in Atkins, the state is
now prohibited from executing a juvenile offender. 20  Based on this
argument, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed. 21 After the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari, the Court then had to decide whether the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid the execution of a convicted
juvenile, who was under 18 at the time the offense was committed.2 2 In
deciding this, the Court looked to (1) whether a national consensus had
developed for or against the juvenile death penalty; and (2) new attitudes
that juveniles are too immature to be held fully culpable.23
In determining whether a national consensus had developed, the Court
looked to state attitudes regarding the execution of juveniles. In Stanford v.
Kentucky, the Court held that a prevailing number of states allowed for the
juvenile death penalty; however, now the Supreme Court faced a different
climate.24 At the time of the Stanford decision, only twelve states had laws
prohibiting the juvenile death penalty and fifteen states had laws prohibiting
the execution of a juvenile seventeen years old or younger. 25  However in
2005, five more states had prohibited it. 26  Although this is clearly not a
majority of states, as vigorously pointed out by the dissent, the Court looked
to other factors, such as the actual rate of execution in states where the
juvenile death penalty was still allowed. 2' The Court considered execution
19. Crucial to the Court's decision to reverse Penry was the rapid change in state attitudes
towards the execution of the mentally retarded. "Impressive in Atkins was the rate of abolition of the
death penalty for the mentally retarded. Sixteen States that permitted the execution of the mentally
retarded at the time of Penry had prohibited the practice by the time we heard Atkins." Roper, 543
U.S. at 565.
20. Roper, 543 U.S. at 559.
21. Id.at 559.
22. Simmons argument forces the Court to reconsider their decision in Stanford v. Kentucky,
which held that 16 and 17 year old juveniles could be lawfully executed under the Eighth
Amendment. Roper, 543 U.S. at 555-56.
23. Id. at 564, 570.
24. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. at 370.
25. Id. Writing for the majority in Stanford, Justice Scalia stated that this was insufficient to
establish a national consensus. Id.
26. Roper, 543 U.S. at 560.
27. See id. at 567. The Court explains:
As in Atkins, the objective indicia of consensus in this case-the rejection of the juvenile
death penalty in the majority of States; the infrequency of its use even where it remains
on the books; and the consistency in the trend toward abolition of the practice-provide
sufficient evidence that today our society views juveniles, in the words Atkins used
respecting the mentally retarded, as "categorically less culpable than the average
criminal."
4
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 7, Iss. 3 [2007], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol7/iss3/4
[Vol. 7: 3, 2007]
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL
statistics, developed by Victor L. Streib, to determine the actual rate of
execution. According to Streib, between 1973 and February 2005-the date
of the Roper decision-only 22 juveniles have been executed.28 Moreover,
"the annual death sentencing rate has been declining rapidly and now is at its
lowest point in 15 years."29  The Court believed that these statistics
illustrated the public sentiment that a juvenile was "less culpable than the
average criminal."30
The Court also considered several other factors in determining whether
a national consensus for or against the juvenile death penalty had developed.
For instance, in developing the Federal Death Penalty Act, Congress
concluded in 1994 that juvenile defendants should not be subject to the death
penalty. 31 The Court took into account popular opinion polls: an ABC news
poll from 2003 found that only 21% of those polled believed that juveniles
should be executed for murder, over a life sentence.3 2  Additionally, the
Supreme Court considered international attitudes regarding the juvenile
death penalty. In particular, the Court found that an international consensus
had developed against the execution of juveniles.33 The Court stated that
although nine countries allowed the death penalty in 1990, these countries
have since abolished or disavowed the juvenile death penalty, causing the
United States to stand alone.34 Taken en masse, the majority was convinced
Id. (citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316).
28. See Victor L. Streib, The Juvenile Death Penalty Today: Death Sentences and Executions
for Juvenile Crimes, January 1, 1973-December 31, 2004, No. 76, 3 (2005), available at
http://www.law.onu.edu/faculty/streib/documents/JuvDeathDec2004.pdf (last updated Jan. 31,
2005).
29. See Streib, supra note 28, at 3.
30. See supra note 27.
31. See 18 U.S.C. § 3591. The statute explicitly holds that "no person may be sentenced to
death who was less than 18 years of age at the time of the offense." Id.
32. See Streib, supra note 28, at 3.
33. However, as the dissent is quick to point out, the test is whether a national consensus had
developed, not an international consensus. Although international sentiments might play a part in
the politics of the death penalty, the majority oversteps constitutional boundaries by not limiting its
analysis to a national consensus. Roper, 543 U.S. at 622 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[t]hough the views
of our own citizens are essentially irrelevant to the Court's decision today, the views of other
countries and the so-called international community take center stage.").
34. Id. at 577. The countries that allowed the juvenile death penalty in 1990 were: "Iran,
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and China." Id. The
U.N. has expressly forbid the execution of juveniles in Article 37 of the United Nations Convention
on the Rights of the Child. Id. at 576. However, this article has not been ratified by two countries:
The United States, and Somalia. Id.
479
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that both an international and a national consensus had developed against the
juvenile death penalty.35
Second, the Court looked to new attitudes about the maturity level of
juveniles. Under death penalty jurisprudence, the Eighth Amendment
demands that only those most deserving of execution should be sentenced to
death, due to the severe nature of the penalty.36 The majority based its
holding in part on the fact that "the character of a juvenile is not as well
formed as that of an adult. The personality traits are more transitory and less
fixed."3 7  Previous Supreme Court holdings established that 15 year-olds
could not be executed.38 Yet in extending this prohibition to all juveniles,
the Court took into account new research regarding the maturation and
development of the teenage mind.39 Over the 15 years since the Stanford
decision, new research has come to light that the juvenile mind is not fully
formed at eighteen years of age. a0 In fact, juveniles lack the level "of
judgment, impulse control, or ability to assess risks," that adults possess.4 1
Based on these findings, the Court believed that juveniles-much like
mentally retarded defendants-were inherently less culpable than those
cold-blooded murderers who actually deserved execution.42
Ultimately, the Court weighed the public's interest in retribution and did
not find that it merits the execution of juveniles. 43 Justice Scalia, however,
35. Id. at 575-576.
36. Roper, 543 U.S. at 568.
37. Id. at 570.
38. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988) ("[t]he reasons why juveniles are not
trusted with the privileges and responsibilities of an adult also explain why their irresponsible
conduct is not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult.").
39. This evidence comes from magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scans performed on
adolescents. In particular, these studies show that the frontal lobes of the brain-responsible for
impulsive behavior, risk-management, and foresight-are "one of the last parts of the brain to reach
maturity." Brief for the American Psychological Association, and the Missouri Psychological
Association as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 10, Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633)
(citing Nitin Gigtay et al., Dynamic Mapping of Human Cortical Development During Childhood
Through Early Adulthood, 101 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 8174, 8177 (2004)).
40. "Although the precise underlying mechanisms continue to be explored, what is certain is
that, in late adolescence, important aspects of brain maturation remain incomplete, particularly those
involving the brain's executive function." Brief for the American Psychological Association at 12,
Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633). In fact, drawing the line of majority at 18 may be too low. "[A]
study, based on a sample of more than 1,000 adolescents and adults, established that psychosocial
maturity is incomplete until age 19, at which point it plateaus." Brief of the American Medical
Association et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 4, Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-
633).
41. Brief of the American Medical Association et al. at 4, Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-
633).
42. Roper, 543 U.S. at 571.
43. Id. at 575.
480
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dissented in Roper and rejected a categorical rule forbidding the death
penalty, writing that in some situations, the death penalty is warranted.
Scalia opined that some juveniles are "just as culpable as adults." a  For
certain reprehensible crimes, Scalia believes that the juvenile offender may
be beyond rehabilitation and deserves the full punishment of the law. 4' To
determine this, the jury should take into account the particular circumstances
of the case and any mitigating or aggravating factors, rather than simply
forbid the execution of juvenile offenders. a6 Because the jury is in the best
position to determine the culpability of the offender, Scalia opined that the
ability to prescribe a death sentence should not be removed from the jury's
hands. 7
Justice O'Connor also dissented along these lines. Although she
conceded that juveniles are less mature than adults and therefore less
culpable, she believed that "at least some 17-year-old murderers are
sufficiently mature to deserve the death penalty in an appropriate case. ', 48
Rather than consider juveniles as a class in the aggregate, Justice O'Connor
opined that age alone cannot be substituted as a measure of an individual's
44. Id. at 618 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia recounts the facts in Roper, where the
defendant described his plan to his friends, before binding Shirley Crook with duct tape and
throwing her offa bridge. Scalia also cites the following example:
In Alabama, two 17-year-olds, one 16-year-old, and one 19-year-old picked up a female
hitchhiker, threw bottles at her, and kicked and stomped her for approximate 30 minutes
until she died. They then sexually assaulted her lifeless body and, when they were
finished, threw her body off a cliff. They later returned to the crime scene to mutilate her
corpse.
Id. at 618-19. In certain, horrific situations such as this, Scalia believed that juries are in the best
position to determine whether the crime warrants the punishment. Id. at 620. However, it is
questionable ifjurors could adequately take into account the defendant's youth and not be swayed by
the nature of the crime.
45. Id. at619.
46. Roper, 543 U.S. at 620 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at615-16.
48. Id. at 588 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). Justice O'Connor saw no
compelling evidence for changing the "reasonable conclusion reached by many state legislatures,"
allowing the jury to determine whether death is appropriate. Id. Choosing to "not substitute [the
Supreme Court's] judgment about the moral propriety of capital punishment for 17-year-old
murderers for the judgments of the Nation's legislatures," Justice O'Connor dissented. Id. Using
the language from Penry v. Lynaugh, O'Connor believed that while the national consensus test is
appropriate under the Eighth Amendment, that each individual state legislature "provide[s] the
'clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values."' Id. at 589 (citing Penry v.
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989)). To this end, Justice O'Connor disagreed with the majority's
use of statistics and international opinion to determine whether a national consensus had been
reached. Id. at 590.
481
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maturity or psychological development. 49  According to her, this differs
from the holding in Atkins, because mentally retarded defendants are, by
definition, less culpable due to their lack of cognitive capacity. 50 Hence,
rather than adopt a brightline rule, the Court should allow the jury to factor
in any mitigating evidence, i.e., youth or immaturity, when determining an
appropriate sentence.51
However, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, disagreed on the
grounds that juries could not adequately separate mitigating evidence from
aggravating evidence in such cases.52 Instead, the majority felt that once the
special, protected status of juveniles is recognized, the state interest in
retribution is not served by the execution of juveniles:
Whether viewed as an attempt to express the community's moral outrage or as an attempt
to right the balance for the wrong to the victim, the case for retribution is not as strong
with a minor as with an adult. Retribution is not proportional if the law's most severe
penalty is imposed on one whose culpability or blameworthiness is diminished, to a
substantial degree, by reason of youth and immaturity.
5 3
When the homicide committed is especially revolting, the prosecutor
will focus on the horrible, senseless nature of the crime instead of protecting
the juvenile's best interest. 54 This could cause the prosecutor to push even
harder for the death penalty, knowing that youth should be a mitigating
factor. For instance, the closing summation given by the prosecution
attempted to use age as an aggravating factor, instead of a mitigating one.55
The prosecutor used the age of the juvenile offender to prove how truly
49. Roper, 543 U.S. at 601 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 602. The sentence must "reflect a reasoned moral response to the defendant's
background, character, and crime." Id. at 603 (citing California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545
(1987)).
52. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 558. The prosecution's speech, for instance, urged that jurors
consider age as an aggravating factor, due to the atrocious nature of the crime:
During closing arguments, both the prosecutor and defense counsel addressed Simmons'
age, which the trial judge had instructed the jurors they could consider as a mitigating
factor. Defense counsel reminded the jurors that juveniles of Simmons' age cannot drink,
serve on juries, or even see certain movies, because "the legislatures have wisely decided
that individuals of a certain age aren't responsible enough." Defense counsel argued that
Simmons' age should make "a huge difference to [the jurors] in deciding just exactly
what sort of punishment to make." In rebuttal, the prosecutor gave the following
response: "Age, he says. Think about age. Seventeen years old. Isn't that scary? Doesn't
that scare you? Mitigating? Quite the contrary I submit. Quite the contrary."
Id. Subsequently, "the jury recommended the death penalty after finding the State had proved each
of the three aggravating factors submitted to it." Id.
53. d. at 571.
54. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 557-58.
55. See supra note 52.
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scary it is when a juvenile commits such a horrible crime-that the age of
the juvenile defendant made the crime even worse.5 6 Such a speech shows
that when the facts are truly horrible, the prosecutor will focus even harder
on seeking the harshest punishment; even if that means ignoring the
juvenile's protected status or the juvenile's interest and ability in
rehabilitation.
III. THE ORIGIN AND THE PERCEIVED FAILURE OF THE JUVENILE SYSTEM
A. The juvenile system originally focused on the rehabilitation ofjuveniles.
A separate juvenile court system originated due to one key distinction:
When a juvenile enters the criminal justice system, the main goal is to
rehabilitate the offender, not to punish the offending conduct.57 This was
based on the assumption that juveniles could be easily reformed because of
their age.58 Their age gives the juvenile criminal case a special status, which
courts have attempted to accommodate by balancing the protection of
juveniles with the state's need for punishment. 59 Thus, the juvenile system
was designed to rehabilitate convicted youths, rather than simply punish the
offensive conduct.
To accomplish this- goal, "juvenile proceedings were designed to be
nonadversarial with all parties involved working together 'in the best
56. See supra note 52.
57. Illinois created the first juvenile court in 1899, where the focus was on rehabilitation, not
punishment. Susan R. Bell, Tenth Annual Corporate Law Symposium: Intellectual Property Law for
the Twenty-First Century: Comment: Ohio gets tough on juvenile crime: an analysis of Ohio's 1996
Amendments concerning the bindover of violent juvenile offenders to the adult system and related
legislation, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 207, 209 (1997). See Matthew William Bell, Comment:
Prosecutorial Waiver in Michigan and Nationwide, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1071, 1072 (2004).
Professor Francis B. McCarthy writes:
Until recently, the juvenile court's central thrust, indeed its entire reason for being, has
been an attempt to reform or rehabilitate children and to prevent them from entering a
lifetime of crime. An integral part of the philosophy of the juvenile court was that
children were not fully responsible for their acts and consequently should be shielded
from the punishment that would be exacted from a responsible actor.
Francis Barry McCarthy, The Serious Offender and Juvenile Court Reform: The Case for
Prosecutorial Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction, 38 ST. LOUIS L.J. 629, 641-42 (1994).
58. McCarthy, supra note 57, at 641-42.
59. See Mattew William Bell, supra note 57, at 1082 ("Juveniles are arguably the most
protected class of individuals in our society, justifying an individualized court system, as well as an
entire set of statutes.").
483
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interests of the child."' 60  This has resulted in the creation of a separate
juvenile court system, in addition to statutes designed to protect the juvenile
defendant. 6' Some of these differences include:
The terms "warrants," "trials," "sentences," and "guilty" were replaced by "petitions,"
"hearings," "dispositions," "delinquency," respectively. In order to reduce the stigma of
the proceedings, hearings were conducted in private, as opposed to the publicized trials of
adults. Moreover, the juvenile hearings were designed to be less formal with judges often
abandoning their black robes and benches for a more confererence-like setting around a
table. 62
Because the focus and the methods were specific to juvenile cases,
juvenile offenders became special in the eyes of the court. Due to their age
and lack of maturity, juvenile offenders were seen as malleable, and thus,
candidates for rehabilitation.
Despite these goals, over time an increasing number of juveniles have
found themselves in adult court. 63  There are two methods by which a
juvenile is tried as an adult: (1) legislative waiver, also known as statutory
"bindover" laws created by the states; and (2) judicial waiver. 64 States have
increasingly created mandatory statutes known as "bindover" laws that place
a juvenile in adult court-instead of a juvenile court-for more
reprehensible offenses, i.e., homicide.65 When juveniles commit these
crimes, these new state laws rendered them incorrigible and beyond
rehabilitation.66  The theory behind this principle is that the individual
juvenile perpetrator who committed such a reprehensible crime was
incapable of correction, and therefore would not benefit from the
rehabilitation offered by the juvenile system.67
60. See Susan R. Bell, supra note 57, at 209.
61. See Susan R. Bell, supra note 57, at 208. Juvenile courts were special because they were
designed to differ in a number of ways from the existing adult courts. Id.
62. Id. at 209.
63. See McCarthy supra note 57, at 631-632.
64. See Id. See also Matthew William Bell, supra note 57, at 1072. In 1999, 46 states,
including the District of Columbia, allow for judicial waiver. Office of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Department of Justice, Statistical Briefing Book, at
http://www.ojjdp.ncjrs.gov/ojstatbb/ structure-process/ qa04102.asp?qaDate=20020425 (last visited
Mar. 9, 2006).
65. See Susan R. Bell, supra note 57, at 209.
66. See Matthew William Bell, supra note 27, at 1072 n.10 (citing DAVID L. MYERS,
EXCLUDING VIOLENT YOUTHS FROM JUVENILE COURT: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF LEGISLATIVE
WAIVER 28 (2001) ("the decision to transfer a case still denotes that a youthful offender is beyond
whatever treatment capacity remains in the juvenile justice system,")).
67. But see Victor L. Streib, Executing Juvenile Offenders: The Ultimate Denial of Juvenile
Justice, 14 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 121 (2003). Streib "wonders if these are absolutely the worst
cases: the mass murderers, the precocious Jack the Rippers. Or are they simply a random sample of
those sentenced to death and who happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time?" Id. at 126.
484
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Similarly, judicial waiver works much the same way. Typically, the
court in most states has the initial authority over juvenile offense cases. 68 If
the court deems the case outside the jurisdiction of the juvenile court system,
the case can be transferred to adult court.
69
Regardless of the method, juveniles themselves waive their protected
status by committing heinous crimes. When the nature of these crimes is
atrocious, the state prosecutor must balance the public interest in punishment
against the juvenile's interest in rehabilitation.7' If the public interest
outweighs the possibility of rehabilitation, state prosecutors will charge a
juvenile as an adult under these bindover laws.72 In essence, the prosecutor
has effectively determined that the juvenile would not benefit from the
rehabilitation offered by the juvenile system. The system will then treat the
juvenile as an adult, subject to adult penalties. 73 Pre-Roper this could lead to
a jury sentencing a 17-year-old defendant to death; now the stiffest penalty
faced is that of a life sentence.74 Regardless of the penalty, when juveniles
are placed in adult court, they no longer benefit from a system designed to
protect their interests-they have essentially waived their juvenile status.
Based on studies, most of those sentenced to death are black or latino males who have committed
crimes against white women. Id. at 127-28, 130.
68. See McCarthy supra note 57, at 631-632.
69. See McCarthy supra note 57, at 631-632.
70. Roper, 543 U.S. at 573.
71. See Michele Cotton, Back with a Vengeance: The Resilience of Retribution as the
Articulated Purpose of Criminal Punishment, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1313, 1318 (2000). There are
four purported goals of the any criminal sentence: retribution (punishment for the crime); deterrence
(to dissuade future criminals from offending); incapacitation ("to remove the offender from
society"); and rehabilitation (to improve the offender so that he or she will not commit further
crimes). Id. at 1315-17. Rehabilitation-the main goal of the juvenile system, and an impossible
goal if a defendant is sentenced to death-becomes the focus of the prosecutor's inquiry pre-Roper.
Therefore, the prosecutor must balance this goal with that of retribution to determine if a sentence is
appropriate.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. McCarthy, supra note 57.
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B. The perceived failure of the juvenile system.
Recently bindover laws have gained popularity due to the perceived
failure of the juvenile system to handle capital offenders. 5 Although any
homicide is a tragedy that garners a certain amount of local attention,
juvenile cases receive far greater national news coverage.7 6 One only has to
look to certain, recent crimes, such as when 18-year-old David Ludwig
killed his 14-year-old girlfriend's parents before abducting her, and the
murder of prominent defense attorney David Horowitz's wife at the hands of
16-year-old neighbor Scott Dyleski.77 A quick search of headlines on
CNN.com between January and February 2006 illustrates the increased
attention given to juvenile cases. For instance, on January 12, 2006, three
teenagers murdered a homeless person in Florida.78 Similarly, on January
21, 2006, a 17-year-old teenager named Sarah Kolb killed her best friend in
a fast-food parking lot, burned and dismembered her body, and hid her
remains in two counties; if convicted she faces up sixty years.79
Because these crimes have gained so much national attention, the stakes
are even higher to reach a "just" outcome. Thus, these juveniles will be tried
as adults, subject to adult penalties. The more public and despicable a
crime, especially when committed by a juvenile, the more willing the
public-represented by the state prosecutor-becomes to try the juvenile in
75. "Today, faith in the system's capacity for rehabilitation has been largely lost. There also
seems to be a growing sentiment that some juveniles are indeed responsible for their actions and
should be held accountable for them." See McCarthy supra note 57, at 641-42.
76. Homicides committed by juveniles receive a great deal more media attention than the
average homicide. In particular:
Americans still believe that crime, and particularly juvenile crime is a desperate problem,
possibly because of the sensationalization of specific instances of juvenile crime by the
media. Juvenile violent crime receives countless hours of news coverage, particularly on
television, while coverage of issues that may contribute to juvenile crime, such as child
welfare and education, is sparse. Compounding this problem is the media's presentation
of such crime, which usually includes graphic dramatization of the juveniles' acts,
without discussing the various factors that led to the behavior, thereby making the
children seem all the more disturbed.
Elena R. Laskin, How Parental Liability Statutes Criminalize and Stigmatize Minority Mothers, 37
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1195, 1200 (2000).
77. CNN.com, http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/ 1/14/parents.slain/index.html (last visited Mar.
9, 2006); Findlaw.com, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/2005 1024_spilbor.html (last
visited Mar. 9, 2006).
78. CNN.com, http://www.cnn.com/2006/LAW/02/22/meangirl.convicted.ap/index.html (last
visited Mar. 8, 2006).
79. CNN.com, http://www.cnn.com/2006/LAW/02/22/meangirl.convicted.ap/index.html (last
visited Mar. 8, 2006).
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adult court. 80 In order to represent the public's interests, district attorneys
frequently seek the maximum sentence for these heinous crimes. 8' Because
state prosecutors represent "the people," by analogy the public deems such a
juvenile offender incapable of reform, and therefore would not benefit from
the rehabilitation offered by the juvenile court system.82
As certain juvenile crimes gather more media attention, the focus turns
to one of punishment, rather than reform. Although the juvenile system
originally developed based on the belief that the public was best served by
rehabilitating a juvenile offender, the nature of the crime often provokes
greater attention. Moreover, the age of the offender can conversely increase
public outcry that this juvenile be punished. Therefore, legitimate public
interests are often subject to knee-jerk public reactions. Within this context,
a juvenile could be executed for his or her crimes, despite the original focus
of the juvenile system.
However, sometimes the public reacts compassionately towards a high-
profile juvenile case and does not abandon the possibility of rehabilitation.
For instance, on February 23, 2006, Cody Posey-who murdered his family
when he was only 14, after years of physical and mental abuse-was
convicted and sentenced to a juvenile detention facility, where he will be
released upon turning 21.83 The prosecutor told reporters that
"unfortunately, there are some kids we can't fix, and this is one of them,"
and sought a sentence up to 50 years for the killings. 84  The prosecutor
80. For example, on Halloween 2005, Brendan Dassey, a 16 year old, reportedly assisted his
uncle in raping and murdering a young photographer named Teresa Halbach. The prosecutor, Ken
Kratz, stated: "I intend to hold each of these defendants accountable for the rape, torture and murder
of Teresa Halbach." CNN.com, http://www.cnn. com/2006/LAW/03/03/woman.slain.ap/index.html
(last visited Mar. 8, 2006). Although the defense alleges that Brendan Dassey was coerced by his
uncle, the public has an interest in punishing the perpetrators of such a heinous crime. As such, the
district attorney represents the interests of the citizens in seeking a just result.
81. But see Laura Beresh-Taylor, Preventing Violence in Ohio's Schools, 33 AKRON L. REV.
311, 344-345 (2000) ("[d]espite sensational media coverage of juvenile crime, incarceration should
not be impulsively imposed on all juveniles.").
82. See Victor L. Streib, Essay: Sentencing Juvenile Murderers: Punish the Last Offender or
Save the Next Victim?, 26 U. TOL. L. REV. 765, 769 (1995) ("[p]rosecuting attorneys are charged to
represent the people of the jurisdiction-the community, if you will.").
83. See CNN.com, http://www.cnn.com/2006/LAW/02/20/ranch.killings.ap/index.html (last
visited Mar. 8, 2006). Cody Posey had killed his parents after his father burned him with a welding
rod for refusing to have sex with his step-mother. Id. Because Posey had been abused for years, the
public gathered and held a candlelight vigil for him prior to the sentencing. See CNN.com,
http://www.cnn.cor/2006/LAW/02/20/ranch.killings.ap/index.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2006).
84. See CNN.com, http://www.cnn.com/2006/LAW/02/20/ranch.killings.ap/index.html (last
visited Mar. 8, 2006).
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commented further that his conduct was "the worst possible behavior that we
can think of to use to predict his future behavior." 85 However, the trial
judge found that the prosecutors failed to prove that he was beyond
rehabilitation based on the testimony of staff workers who oversaw Posey at
a juvenile detention facility. 86 After the sentencing, Cody welcomed the
chance for rehabilitation: he apologized and asked for a chance to better
himself.87 The court listened and granted him a lenient sentence, allowing
him the opportunity for rehabilitation. 88  Thus, while the public may
consider some juveniles beyond rehabilitation, some may truly benefit from
the rehabilitation offered by the juvenile system, even when the crime itself
is severe.
IV. PLEA BARGAINING POST-ROPER.
Plea bargaining is, in the words of the Supreme Court, an "'important'
and an 'essential' component of our criminal justice system." 89 It is "the
process by which a defendant in a criminal trial relinquishes his right to go
to trial in exchange for a reduction in charge and/or sentence." 90 "Nearly all
criminal cases that are terminated without a completed trial reach a
disposition by means of some form of negotiation."9' Ninety percent of
criminal cases end not in trials, but in plea bargains. 92
Both the prosecution and the defense benefit from plea bargaining.
93
The prosecution is rewarded with a reduced caseload and more cases
resulting in incarceration time, which will satiate the public's interest in
punishment. 94  Moreover, the defendant will benefit from a reduced
sentence, which will benefit them even under statutory sentencing
guidelines. 9"
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. R. MICHAEL CASSIDY, PROSECUTORIAL ETHICS 81 (2005) (citing Bordenkircher v. Hayes,
434 U.S. 357, 361 (1978) and Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971)).
90. MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS, JUDGES,
AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS 1 (1978).
91. DAVID A. JONES, CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT 109 (1979).
92. See GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING'S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN
AMERICA, 233 Tbl. 9.1 (2003).
93. See CASSIDY, supra note 89.
94. Id.
95. Id. In federal court, a defendant receives point deductions for avoiding trial.
14
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 7, Iss. 3 [2007], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol7/iss3/4
[Vol. 7: 3, 2007]
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL
Roper will undoubtedly affect the ability to reach plea bargains in
juvenile cases. By eliminating the juvenile death penalty, juries have lost
their ability to determine whether a juvenile defendant is culpable enough to
deserve execution. Similarly, prosecutors will lose some of their ability to
settle the case through plea bargaining. However, defense attorneys-and
the juvenile clients they represent-will benefit from the Roper holding.
Moreover, by reducing the stakes of the case, both the prosecution and the
defense can focus on achieving the "right" result, not just the harshest.
A. The changing role of the jury.
The Roper decision will remove the jury from the equation and will
place the focus back on the parties. Formerly, the ultimate decision whether
to execute rested with the jury, who could consider mitigating (age,
intelligence, or upbringing) or aggravating circumstances (nature of the
crime). 96 However, post-Roper, the jury cannot play a role in determining
the outcome, therefore the burden to reach the "right" result will return to
the prosecutor and defense attorney.
Although only the prosecutor could choose to seek the death penalty,
ultimately the final say was left to the jury. Because the ultimate decision to
execute or not to execute rests with the jury, they must consider the
circumstances and life of the offender. Before the holding in Roper, the jury
decided whether a convicted juvenile would be put to death. Similar to
every death penalty case, after the guilt phase of the trial, the jury would
have to decide whether the death penalty was warranted. After the close of
the guilt phase of the trial, the case progresses to a sentencing phase, unique
to death penalty cases. In this phase, each party presents their arguments
either for or against the death penalty. To this end, the parties present either
mitigating or aggravating circumstances. Mitigating circumstances include,
but are not limited to, factors such as age, intelligence, or upbringing.
97
Similarly, aggravating circumstances often involve the particular facts or the
nature of the crime.98 Jurors are required to assess these factors when
determining if punishment of the offense warrants the death penalty.
Beyond weighing the defendant's culpability against the nature of the
crime, the jury functions on a more esoteric level as representatives of the
96. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 628.
97. See 41 C.J.S. Homicide§ 519 (1991).
98. Id.
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public. Each juror has to weigh the public interest in execution and decide
whether the punishment fits the crime. Because a criminal defendant must
be tried by a jury of his or her peers, the random selection of jurors
represents a sampling of public interest. In terms of juvenile offenders,
juries-serving as representatives of that public interest-seldom sentenced
juvenile defendants to death. 99 Although pre-Roper juries had the ability to
order a death sentence, juries would rarely give juveniles the death penalty
and those that were sentenced to death were rarely executed. 100
However, Roper's categorical rule against the juvenile death penalty
removes any individualized fact finding by the jury. Justices Scalia and
O'Connor voiced this concern in their vigorous dissenting opinions in
Roper.'0 Juries can no longer consider whether the juvenile possesses the
maturity, and hence the culpability, that warrants a heftier sentence.
Nonetheless, the decision in Roper removes the ultimate question of death or
life from the jury. No longer is the jury free to consider aggravating or
mitigating circumstances. Because the jury has lost its power to reach the
"right" result, the power to resolve the case has fallen back into the hands of
the parties: the prosecutor and the defendant.
B. The Prosecutor's Role
The prosecutor plays a unique role in the criminal justice system,
especially when it comes to juvenile cases. Because of this role, a
prosecutor should strive to do justice, or "achieve a 'just,' and not
necessarily the most harsh, result." 0 2 This applies not just to the trial, but to
the entire system-including the terms of a plea bargain. 13 As such,
prosecutors are the masters of the plea bargain because they control the
charge and the sentence. How they will approach capital juvenile cases
post-Roper remains unclear. If prosecutors sought to achieve a plea bargain
99. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 571.
100. See Streib, supra note 67.
101. See supra notes 43-51 and accompanying text.
102. Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors "Seek Justice"?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607,
608 (1999). Green argues that "doing justice" requires prosecutors to do more than simply telling
the truth and keeping their word. Id. at 609. Rather, than acting as a zealous advocate for the state
and seeking a conviction at all costs, the prosecutor should instead act in a "quasi-judicial" manner
and serve both the court and the defendant fairly. Id. at 617. In short:
It is to be regretted that prosecuting counsel, in the heat of contest and in the desire for
victory, sometimes forget that the function of a district attorney is largely judicial, and
that he owes to the defendant as solemn a duty of fairness as he is bound to give to the
state full measure of earnestness and fervor in the performance of his official obligations.
Id. at 614 n.18 (citing People v. Tufts, 139 P. 78, 81 (Cal. 1914)).
103. See Green, supra 102, at 608.
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to a life sentence by threatening the death penalty, their ability to achieve
this result is compromised.
Whether one views a prosecutor as the pursuer of justice, or as an agent
of the government seeking the harshest possible punishment, it is generally
in the prosecutors best interest to negotiate a plea or to settle a case before
trial. A successfully negotiated plea benefits the government by ensuring
some punishment is given, thereby protecting the public's interest.'0
4
Beyond avoiding the hassles of a trial, and the possibility of defeat, a plea
bargain conserves the scant resources available to state prosecutors.
10 5
Therefore, plea bargains allow prosecutors to win sentences more
successfully and to tackle more cases concurrently. Additionally, the
expense of going to trial is avoided, including the salaries and costs of the
judge, the prosecutor, the defense attorney, the court staff, etcetera. 106 The
prosecutor can also avoid any negative opinions associated with losing the
case, especially if the lost case has generated a lot of publicity.'07
Because there is a heightened need to achieve the right outcome in
juvenile cases, prosecutorial discretion becomes even more vital. However,
prosecutors do not always have discretion in how they pursue juvenile
cases. 10 8  Although prosecutors generally have broad discretion in the
charges they file, they typically exercise these powers only (1) in minor
criminal cases; or (2) where prosecution of the juvenile offender is not in the
best public interest.' 0 9  This excludes the majority of criminal capital
cases-virtually all juvenile capital cases are homicides, with the potential
of life sentences." I0 Moreover, the shifting trend towards trying serious
juvenile offenses in adult court illustrates the public's attitudes towards
effective prosecution of these cases. The Roper decision narrows this
discretion; prosecutors now have less bargaining power to effectuate pleas.
104. See CASSIDY, supra note 89, at 81.
105. See CASSIDY, supra note 89, at 81. However, the theory that prosecutors settle cases to
avoid heavy case loads has come under some attack. See Heumann supra note 90, at 27. See also
WILLIAM F. MCDONALD, PLEA BARGAINING, COMMON ISSUES AND PRACTICES, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 19 (1985).
106. See JONES, supra note 91, at 63.
107. Id.
108. Victor L. Streib, Prosecutorial Discretion in Juvenile Homicide Cases, 109 PENN. STATE
L. REV. 1071, 1077 (2005).
109. Id.
110. See Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Department of Justice,
Statistical Briefing Book, at http://ojjdp.ncjrs.org/ojstatbb/crime/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2006).
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However, bargaining is not between equal parties; the prosecutor wields
enormous power over the defendant in plea negotiations."' Because of this
power imbalance, a prosecutor cannot assume that simply because a plea
negotiation was reached in a juvenile case that the result is just. 1"2 By virtue
of their position, prosecutors can influence the plea bargaining process by
seeking two types of pleas: a sentence bargain, or a charge bargain."1 3 A
sentence bargain allows a defendant to plead to a charge, in exchange for a
more lenient sentence.' i4 On the other hand, a charge bargain allows a
defendant to plead guilty to one charge, in exchange for the prosecutor
dismissing other charges against the defendant. '
Typically, a charge bargain does not apply in capital juvenile cases,
unless the prosecutor has charged multiple counts of homicide. 116 However,
through use of a sentence bargain, the prosecutor has the power to influence
the plea by allowing a juvenile defendant to plead guilty to a life sentence, in
order to avoid the possibility of a death sentence if the juvenile went to trial.
This practice is known as "vertical overcharging," which involves "charging
a single offense at a higher level than the circumstances of the case seem to
warrant." "17
Although prosecutors commonly engage in this kind of plea bargaining,
it could be seen as unethical to blackmail." 8 These kinds of actions speak
more about the skill of the attorneys, rather than the merits of the case and
usually involve "gamesmanship" on both the prosecutors and defense
attorney's sides. " 9 Gamesmanship can lead to unfair plea bargains; if the
means used to achieve the plea are unjust, the plea itself is also the wrong
result. 20 However, courts are reluctant to consider such a bargain as a
IIl. See CASSIDY, supra note 89, at 82.
112. See CASSIDY, supra note 89, at 82.
113. David A. Starkweather, Note: The Retributive Theory of "'Just Deserts" and Victim
Participation in Plea Bargaining, 67 IND. L.J. 853, 858 (1992).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. McDonald supra note 105, at 19.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 49.
120. See People v. Rice, 69 N.Y.2d 781, 782 (1987). In Rice, during plea negotiations, the
prosecution purposefully withheld the fact that a star prosecution witness had died. Id. The
defendant took the plea, even though he would not have pled had he known about the death of the
witness. Id. As a result, the court found the prosecutor guilty of prosecutorial misconduct and
withdrew the plea. Id.
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violation of due process, but rather as part of the "give and take" nature of
plea bargaining. 121
If a prosecutor focuses on "doing justice," as opposed to focusing on
receiving the harshest result possible, the Roper decision could lead to a
more fair result. Because the power balance between a juvenile defendant
and a prosecutor is grossly disproportional, the incentive for a juvenile to
plead to a life sentence-even if the juvenile is innocent-is great.122 In a
study done on the rate of false confessions, out of 125 proven false
confessions, 40 of them were given by juveniles charged with homicide. 23
Additionally, professional agencies that train law enforcement personal in
interrogation techniques advise that false confessions from juveniles "appear
with some regularity in false confession cases."' 124 This allows a juvenile,
when faced with the pressure of a homicide charge, to confess to a crime he
or she did not commit. 125  Moreover, a juvenile defendant may not truly
understand the ramifications of the charges before him. 26 Before the Roper
decision, the threat of possible execution could unduly coerce an innocent
juvenile into confessing, in order to receive a life sentence instead. Now the
concern that an innocent juvenile could face death evaporates. A prosecutor
concerned with seeking justice, and not with the harshest punishment
available, would actually stand to benefit from the lesser bargaining power
offered post-Roper.
In addition to reaching a "just" outcome regarding the juvenile
defendant, the prosecutor must also consider the victim's desire for
121. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978). In this case, the Supreme Court
held it is not vindictive prosecution for a prosecutor to threaten greater charges if the defendant
rejects a plea bargain. Id.
122. See CASSIDY, supra note 89, at 82.
123. Brief of Juvenile Law Center et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 27, Roper,
543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633) (citing to Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of
False Confessions in the post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891, 947 (2004)).
124. Brief of Juvenile Law Center et al. at 27-28, Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633).
125. Id.
126. See CASSIDY, supra note 89, at 82. Because of their youth, juveniles suffer from
"immature decision-making abilities, as well as their limited time perspective, emphasis on short-
term benefits versus long term benefits, and willingness to take risks." Brief of Juvenile Law Center
et al. at 26, Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633) (citing Thomas Grisso & Laurence Steinberg et al.,
Juveniles' Competence to Stand Trial: A Comparison ofAdolescents and Adults' Capacities as Trial
Defendants, 27 LAW & HUMAN BEH. 333, 353-56 (2003)).
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justice. 127  Typically, the facts in these cases are so reprehensible that the
victim has a strong desire for retribution. 128  The plea bargaining system
shuts out the victim from this process--only the prosecutor and the
defendant are involved in plea negotiations. 129 If the defendant reached a
plea bargain for life imprisonment, instead of the death penalty, the victim
may feel that the system neglected his or her interests. However, in a post-
Roper world where juveniles can no longer be sentenced to death, this
interest is completely negated. Because victims now know that the juvenile
cannot be executed, from the inception of the case, they cannot feel that the
local prosecutor let them down. Alternatively, they could direct their
frustration on the United States Supreme Court; however, the local state
District Attorney's office would be exempt from any criticism. The victim
could at least take solace in knowing that the prosecutors tried their best to
receive a "just" outcome. Thus, prosecutorial agencies could experience
some freedom from having to cater to the victims' need for retribution.
Similarly, the prosecutor must also cater to the public's need for just
punishment. Juvenile capital cases usually garner a great deal of media
coverage. 130 The stakes are raised even higher when the public decides to
focus in on the case. Usually the facts of these cases are so reprehensible
that the natural public reaction is to try the juvenile in adult court and to seek
a heavier sentence. Even if the case does not gain national attention, it
usually will create a stir in the local community. These extra concerns mean
the prosecutor will be less willing to settle these cases, because they must
cater to public sentiment.
In sum, while prosecutors may lose some of their bargaining power, this
could result in a more just outcome. Although their ability to achieve plea
bargains might be compromised, any prosecutor who is more concerned with
doing justice--certainly having an innocent juvenile plead to charges to
avoid the death penalty is unjust-would no longer be able to seek the death
penalty. In turn, any community pressure to seek a heftier sentence is
127. Although prosecutors commonly include the victim in the sentencing process, the
assumption that victims have something to contribute could be a fallacy. See Streib supra note 83, at
768-69. Streib writes that:
A criminal trial and sentencing hearing are about the crime and the accused, and as such,
seem particularly ill-suited to serve as a wake or funeral service for the deceased
victim ... we are inducing prosecutors to see themselves as representing the victim and
the victim's family, rather than representing the state as is their duty.
Id.
128. See supra note 44. Writing for the dissent in Roper, Justice Scalia painstakingly describes
two horrific homicides committed by juveniles.
129. See Starkweather, supra note 113, at 858.
130. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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reduced post-Roper. Therefore this limitation would serve justice better,
even at the expense of some bargaining power.
C. Defense Attorney's Role
The representation of a death penalty case poses a higher challenge for a
defense attorney than a regular case. In the eyes of the court, "death is
different." "' Consequently, defense attorneys are advised to treat a death
penalty case differently than their regular cases.' 32 The defense attorney
must "constantly consider the death sentencing ramifications of each step
prior to the actual sentencing hearing itself."'133 This heightened sensitivity
towards the consequences of failure infects the entire case.
Similarly, juvenile cases also differ from adult cases. Pre-Roper, when
the age of the defendant was coupled with a potential death sentence, the
stakes were raised even higher. Because of the age of the defendant,
juveniles require special protections and concerns that also elevate the nature
of the case. The defense attorney's focus would shift from reducing jail time
to saving a juvenile's life. When seeking a plea bargain to avoid the death
penalty, there are three kinds of life sentences, which a defendant can plead
to: (1) life without parole; (2) life with a fixed minimum sentence, i.e.,
twenty-five years; or (3) life where the defendant may be eligible for parole
after seven to ten years. 134  Each of these pleas still holds profound
ramifications for a juvenile defendant: the possibility of a lost life.
Because of the harsh penalties faced by juvenile offenders, defense
attorneys must treat these cases differently by communicating more openly
with prosecutors. When representing a juvenile capital case, the defense
attorney should maintain pressure on any person in a position to encourage a
plea bargain, which in turn requires the attorney to foster more
communication and greater cooperation with the prosecutor.135 To do this,
131. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972)).
132. Dennis N. Balske, New Strategies for the Defense of Capital Cases, 31 AKRON L. REV.
331, 333 (1997).
133. Victor Streib, Standing Between the Child and the Executioner: The Special Role of
Defense Counsel in Juvenile Death Penalty Cases, 31 AM. J. CRIM. L. 67 (2003).
134. See Balske, supra note 132, at 333. The nature of the plea bargain depends on the state.
Id.
135. See Balske, supra note 132, at 334. Maintaining open communication does not mean
catering to the prosecutor's whim. Id. Instead of acquiescence, the defense attorney should still
confront the prosecutor "when he has mistreated the defense." Id. The attorney was advised to do
495
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defense attorneys are commonly advised to inform the prosecution that "the
defendant will settle for a life sentence."' 13 6  Additionally, the defense
attorney should contact the victim's family, to prove the attorney is not
seeking to let a guilty person go free but rather to represent a defendant
within the boundaries of the law. 
3 7
However, following Roper, these special concerns disappear. Pre-
Roper, a defense attorney who was ultimately concerned with saving the
juvenile's life might be more willing to settle the case during plea
negotiations. Without the possibility of execution hanging around the
juvenile defendant's neck, the defense attorney can now focus more on the
case, and less on the possible results. This could cause less communication
between the district attorneys and the defense attorneys. The defense
attorney no longer has to work together with the prosecutor if the defense
attorney believes the merits of the case warrant bringing it to trial.
Because the threat of executing the juvenile has been removed, defense
attorneys will have less incentive to settle the case. It may actually be in the
defense attorney's best interest to now try a juvenile capital case, which the
attorney would have otherwise settled pre-Roper. The Roper decision may
encourage defense attorneys, and the juveniles they represent, to take more
cases to trial in hopes of winning on the merits of the case. Although the
penalties faced by juveniles tried in adult court are still severe-life
imprisonment for a youth is certainly no small punishment-the defense
attorney no longer has to try to save the juvenile's life from day one. In
addition, most juvenile capital cases were tried by public defenders, due to
monetary issues. Public defenders may have less incentive to settle because
they do not represent a client who pays for and expects progress at the end of
the day. 138 Absent any concern that the juvenile could be executed, there is
even less incentive for a public defender to settle a case.
Although juvenile defendants tried as adults in homicide cases can no
longer be put to death, the juvenile himself may suffer from a system that
now prefers going to trial. Typically, the juvenile defendant benefits greatly
from the plea bargaining arrangements:
The defendant also enjoys advantages from plea bargaining that he would not enjoy at
trial; including the prompt resolution of the charges against him, the reduction of risk,
and an agreement by the prosecutor to lower the defendant's exposure to punishment by
reducing the charges or recommending a lenient sentence. Even under a "sentencing
this as early as possible and to reaffirm his or her position during preliminary hearings. Id. at 335.
This shows that, regardless of the defense strategy, the entire case is infected when the death penalty
is a possibility. Id.
136. Id. at 334.
137. Balske, supra note 132.
138. See Streib, supra note 133.
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guideline" system, where the defendant's ultimate sentence is fixed by a predetermined
range, the prosecutor has the power to offer concessions to the defendant in order to
induce him to plea guilty, including agreeing to stipulate about the presence or absence of
certain facts that might be considered aggravating or mitigating under the guidelines, and
has the power to represent to the court that the defendant has cooperated substantially
with the government. 139
Given how the juvenile system ultimately seeks rehabilitation, juveniles
stand best able to benefit from the plea bargaining system. The special
concerns of juveniles--coupled with the desire from both sides to reach the
right result-illustrates the importance of plea bargaining juvenile cases.
Plea bargaining, however, is not always in the defendant's best interest,
nor is the result always a just one.140  Certainly any juvenile faced with a
possible death sentence would undoubtedly feel intense pressure that could
unduly coerce them into accepting a plea arrangement. Because of their age,
juvenile offenders may not fully understand the charges against them, and
because they often make impulsive choices focused on short-term benefits,
rather than long term goals, charged juveniles may accept a detrimental plea
bargain. 141 The same impulsivity that causes juvenile offenders to commit
crimes would undoubtedly lead to hasty plea bargains, if guilty. In
addition,if one accepts the conclusion that juveniles as a class are less
rational than adults, even innocent juveniles plead to a charge he or she did
not commit. 142 An innocent defendant may agree to a plea bargain to avoid
the hassles of a trial, especially if the defendant faces a lengthy sentence (or
the death penalty in a pre-Roper era). 143
However, in some aspects, the Roper decision could foster greater plea
bargaining. If defense attorneys insist on bringing more cases to trial, state
prosecutors, when faced with overwhelming court dockets, may settle less
meritorious cases. Simply because the prosecution possesses less bargaining
power does not mean that plea bargains will never occur in juvenile
homicides, but rather that the result of the plea bargain will be more fair
because the special threat of death has been averted. Defense attorneys can
139. See CASSIDY, supra note 89, at 82.
140. See CASSIDY, supra note 89, at 82.
141. See supra notes 122-26. These recent studies, presented to the Supreme Court through
several amici curiae briefs, clearly show that juveniles lack the decision-making skills to properly
assess their situation. See Roper, 543 U.S. 551.
142. See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text. This is not just an assumption-studies
clearly show that innocent juveniles confess to crimes they did not commit. Id.
143. See CASSIDY, supra note 89, at 82.
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focus more on the merits of the case during the negotiation, rather than
evading a death sentence for their young clients.
Ultimately, juveniles stand to benefit from the Roper decision. Without
the possibility of execution to raise the stakes of the case, juvenile
defendants accused of homicide will most likely accept fewer plea bargains.
Conversely, these cases can now play out in court; the evidence can be
presented and the attorneys can argue the case to its full merit. The finders
of fact will now be able to decide if the juvenile is truly incorrigible-or if,
like Cody Posey mentioned above-capable of rehabilitation. The nature of
how the defense attorney approaches a death penalty case is fundamentally
different; instead of trying to reduce the length of incarceration, the defense
attorney is trying to save the defendant's life.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Roper will send ripples through the
entire juvenile justice system. Now that the execution ofjuvenile defendants
is forbidden by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, it will be harder to
successfully plea out juvenile defendants to life sentences. Prosecutors will
no longer be able to settle capital juvenile cases as easily by seeking plea
bargains. Consequently, defense attorneys will no longer feel the need to
plea out their clients to save their lives and will try the cases on their merits.
Ultimately, the approach will change but most likely the result will stay
the same. Although there is now less incentive for a defense attorney to
settle the case, the fact that more cases will now go to trial on the merits will
increase the prosecutor's workload, thereby forcing the prosecutor to plea
out smaller cases. Given that most of the juvenile cases that would warrant
the death penalty are few and far between, the net result will be small if any.
However, the approach will change. In capital juvenile cases, the
attorneys will no longer have any pressing need to negotiate or to reach the
"right result." The special concerns created by the death penalty are
eliminated. Although there are still additional interests at stake due to the
fact that a juvenile is charged, the life of the juvenile is no longer forfeit if
the defense attorney loses (or the prosecution wins). While the cost of a life
sentence is high, especially for a young defendant, a life imprisoned is better
than a life cut short.
Finally, the Roper decision will cause juveniles to unilaterally benefit.
Not only can a juvenile offender not be executed for murder, the defense
attorney no longer has to focus on saving the defendant's life, but can
instead focus on reducing incarceration time. Without the proverbial noose
dangling over a juvenile defendant's head, the system's focus can shift back
to rehabilitation. Although a juvenile could still be sentenced to life in
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prison, the possibility of rehabilitation exists. Moreover, prosecutors can no
longer use the threat of the death penalty as a tool to blackmail the juvenile
into life sentences. If anything, this will cause the prosecutor to operate
more ethically than they are typically accustomed to operating.
With Roper, the Supreme Court has spoken that the public is best served
by not executing juveniles. Prosecutors, as servants of the public interest,
will have to live with the consequences of this. And juveniles, along with
the public, will be served better by a system intent on saving them, instead
of executing them.
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